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INTRODUCTION

In 1970, the Nobel Committee awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to Norman
Ernest Borlaug for inventing new cereal crop strains that reduce the
“environmental and social ills that too often lead to conflict between men and
between nations.”1 In his acceptance speech, Borlaug warned that those
attempting to solve poverty and hunger would not be successful unless they work
together “to provide food and other amenities of a progressive civilization for
the benefit of all mankind.”2 Since then, the estimated prevalence of
undernourishment in developing countries has decreased from 34.75% in 1970
to less than 13% in 2015.3 However, the Green Revolution also rapidly altered
the profitability of farming.4 For American farmers who supply the world with
$118.3 billion of agricultural exports annually,5 farming contributed an average
of only $296 to each household’s income in 2019.6
These economic burdens on American farmers have become oppressive,
partially due to increased input costs with corn and soy seed ranging between
$25 and $70 per acre depending on variety and planting density.7 For these
farmers, artificially heightened seed prices afforded to inventors are a substantial
financial burden. A 2019 survey indicated that “the nonmetro poverty rate was
15.4 percent . . . compared with 11.9 percent for metro areas.”8

Norman
Borlaug
Biographical,
NOBEL
PRIZE,
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1970/borlaug/biographical/ (last visited Jan. 07,
2021).
2
Norman
Borlaug
Acceptance
Speech,
THE
NOBEL
PRIZE,
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1970/borlaug/acceptance-speech/ (last visited
Jan. 07, 2021).
3 Max Rosner & Hannah Ritchie, Hunger and Undernourishment, OUR WORLD IN DATA (2019),
https://ourworldindata.org/hunger-and-undernourishment.
4 See generally Prabhu L. Pingali, Green Revolution: Impacts, Limits, and the Path Ahead, 109(31)
PNAS 12302 (2012) (providing an overview of the Green Revolution in the context of what
a “Green Revolution 2.0” should prioritize).
5
Stephen D. Simpson, Top Agricultural Producing Countries, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/financial-edge/0712/top-agricultural-producingcountries.aspx (last updated July 22, 2021).
6 Highlights from the September 2021 Farm Income Forecast, ECON. RES. SERV. U.S. DEP’T
AGRICULTURE,
https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/farm-sector-incomefinances/highlights-from-the-farm-income-forecast/ (last updated Sept. 2, 2021).
7 Sam McNeill, Control Seed Costs to Manage Profits, UNIV. KY. DEP’T BIOSYSTEMS AND AGRIC.
ENG’G,
https://www.uky.edu/bae/sites/www.uky.edu.bae/files/Seed%20Cost%20Calculator_0.pdf
(last visited Jan. 17, 2021).
8
Rural Poverty and Well-Being, ECON. RES. SERV. U.S. DEP’T AGRICULTURE,
https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/rural-economy-population/rural-poverty-well-being/ (last
updated Sept. 17, 2021).
1

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2021

3

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 7

212

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 29:1

In the agricultural product market, four companies dominate the sale of seeds
and agricultural chemicals: BASF, Bayer, Dow-Dupont, and Syngenta.9 Despite
seed prices increasing more than 30 percent annually,10 these companies justify
high prices by pointing to the $136 million per new variety spent on research and
development from 2008-2012 alone.11 Changing the scheme surrounding
agricultural subsidies would help shift the high costs of biotech development off
of farmers without chilling new seed varieties’ innovation by agricultural product
firms.
Producers of new seed varieties are “protected by utility patents, plant
patents, certification under the Plant Variety Protection Act, and trade secrets.”12
Makers of genetically modified seeds find the highest degree of protection from
the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA), which awards twenty years of exclusive
control over newly propagated plant varieties.13 The exorbitant cost and the
degree of luck involved in developing a successful seed variety limit smaller
companies’ ability to price compete against the big four agri-tech firms in a
particular seed market, especially without infringing on another company’s
intellectual property rights.14 Increasing federal research subsidies to public
agricultural research organizations would help mitigate the trend of agricultural
research becoming profit-oriented instead of need-oriented while not
discouraging private inventors by reducing patent regime protections.
This Note serves to (1) provide background on new seed development and
wealth concentration in the agriculture markets; (2) describe the current
intellectual property regime surrounding agricultural products produced through
See
Segment
Profile, BASF,
https://report.basf.com/2019/en/managementsreport/segments/agricultural-solutions/segment-profile.html (last updated Feb. 28, 2020)
(reporting € 7.81 billion in agricultural product sales in 2019); Christopher Walljasper,
DowDupont Split Off Its Agriculture Business; Here’s What to Know About Corteva Agriscience,
MIDWEST
CTR.
FOR
INVESTIGATIVE
REPORTING
(June
12,
2019),
https://investigatemidwest.org/2019/06/12/dowdupont-split-off-its-agriculture-businessheres-what-to-know-about-corteva-agriscience/ (predicting the wholly-owned agricultural
product subsidiary of the Dow-DuPont merger to make $14.3 billion in agricultural sales in
2019); Annual Report 2018, BAYER, https://www.bayer.com/sites/default/files/202004/bayer_ar18_entire.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2021) (reporting € 14.6 billion in net sales from
Bayer AG in 2018); 2019 Full Year Results, SYNGENTA GLOBAL (Feb. 14, 2020),
https://www.syngenta.com/company/media/syngenta-news/year/2020/2019-full-yearresults (reporting $13.6 billion in agricultural product sales).
10 Aleksandre Maisahvili et al., Seed Prices, Proposed Mergers and Acquisitions Among Biotech Firms,
31(4) CHOICES 1, 4th Quarter 2016, at 1, 4.
11 Cost of Bringing a New Biotech Crop to Market, CROPLIFE INT’L, https://croplife.org/plantbiotechnology/regulatory-2/cost-of-bringing-a-biotech-crop-to-market/ (last visited Jan. 17,
2021).
12 Keith A. Zullow & Raivo A. Karmas, Protecting Intellectual Property in Plants and Seeds, 53
CEREAL FOODS WORLD 319, 319 (2008).
13 See 7 U.S.C. § 2483(b)(1) (stating that “the term of plant variety protection shall expire 20
years from the date of issue of the certificate”).
14 Maisahvili et al., supra note 10, at 2.
9
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biotechnology; (3) describe how the government distributes agricultural subsidies
pre-market to research initiatives and post-market to farmers; and (4) argue that
increasing federal spending towards public agricultural research would be more
effective at reducing the cost of new seed varieties than relaxing current patent
protection and would occur without curbing innovation in the seed development
market.
II. BACKGROUND
The following section provides background information on the development
of new seed varieties. This section describes how seed monopolization affects
farmers’ income to highlight the importance of reducing price barriers in new
seed development. This section also discusses why biotechnology companies sell
genetically modified seeds under single-use licenses and how it has upended
traditional farming practices.
A. SEED VARIETY DEVELOPMENT

Developing higher yield, better tasting, and more resource-efficient crops has
been a priority in the United States since its founding. As President Washington
wrote, “I know of no pursuit in which more zeal [and] important service can be
rendered to any Country than by improving its agriculture. . . .”15 Growing
significantly from a nation of low-technology subsistence farmers,16 the North
American seed market has become a massive industry worth $24 billion in
2019.17
There are two methods commonly used to create new plant varieties. The
first is by inducing mutations in a plant’s genotype and then cross-breeding it
with another plant to achieve specific phenotypic characteristics.18 This method
is an extension of how farmers have traditionally domesticated crops for
thousands of years, by selecting to plant seeds from organisms with desirable
traits or by combining traits between two closely related species through crossbreeding.19 The second method uses recombinant DNA technology, which

Letter from George Washington to John Sinclair (July 20, 1794), in 16 THE PAPERS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON PRESIDENTIAL SERIES, 1 May – 30 September 1794, 394, 394 (David
R. Hoth & Carol S. Ebel eds., 2011).
16 R. DOUGLAS HURT, AMERICAN AGRICULTURE: A BRIEF HISTORY, 112 (2002).
17 North America Seeds Market: Industry Trends, Share, Size, Growth, Opportunity and Forecast 20212026, IMARC, https://www.imarcgroup.com/north-america-seeds-market (last visited Jan. 17,
2021).
18 Inger B. Holme et al., Induced Genetic Variation in Crop Plants by Random or Targeted Mutagenesis:
Convergence and Differences, FRONTIERS IN PLANT SCIENCE, (Nov. 14, 2019),
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpls.2019.01468/full.
19 Wieczorek Ania & Wright Mark, History of Agricultural Biotechnology: How Crop Development Has
Evolved,
NATURE
EDUC.
KNOWLEDGE
PROJECT,
15
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introduces characteristics from another species by isolating the desired gene,
cloning it in a host bacteria, and then introducing the new trait into the target
species.20 In food crops, recombinant DNA is used to increase resistance to
chemical treatments, diseases, environmental conditions, and pests, along with
reducing spoilage and improving the plant’s nutrient profile.21 In non-food
crops, many different industries use the technology in bioremediation (using
microorganisms to convert hazardous materials into non-toxic or less toxic
substances22), the production of pharmaceutical agents, and the creation of
biofuels.23
Genetically modified foods are prevalent in the United States. Over 93
percent of the country’s soy and corn is grown from genetically modified seeds.24
Currently, the federal government has approved ten transgenic crops for human
and animal consumption.25 Some varieties of genetically modified crops have
established a more robust market hold than others. Even though it was released
only ten years ago, the genetically modified sugar beet has grown to dominate
the market. It represents 95 percent of all American-grown sugar beets in 2019.26
In contrast, only 0.07% of all apples harvested and sold in the United States are
genetically modified.27

https://www.nature.com/scitable/knowledge/library/history-of-agricultural-biotechnologyhow-crop-development-25885295/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2021).
20 AFJ Griffiths et al., Making Recombinant DNA, MODERN GENETIC ANALYSIS (1999),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK21407/.
21 ISAAA Brief 46-2013: Executive Summary, INT’L SERV. ACQUISITION AGRI-BIOTECH
APPLICATIONS,
http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/briefs/46/executivesummary/ (last visited
Jan. 17, 2021).
22 What Is Bioremediation?, UNIV. HAWAII, http://www.hawaii.edu/abrp/biordef.html (last
visited Jan. 17, 2021).
23 ISAAA Brief 46-2013: Executive Summary, supra note 21.
24 Brad Plumer, How Widespread are GM Foods?, VOX (July 22, 2015, 12:24 PM),
https://www.vox.com/2014/11/3/18092748/how-widespread-are-gm-foods.
25
GMO Crops, Animal Food, and Beyond, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/food/agricultural-biotechnology/gmo-crops-animal-food-and-beyond
(last updated Sept. 28, 2020) (listing alfalfa, apple, canola, corn, cotton, papaya, potato,
soybean, sugar beet, and summer squash as the approved genetically modified crops).
26 Esther Honig, Sugar Beet Farmers Caught in GMO Debate, Wait for USDA Labeling Decision,
HARVEST PUB. MEDIA (May 18, 2018), https://www.harvestpublicmedia.org/post/sugarbeet-farmers-caught-gmo-debate-wait-usda-labeling-decision.
27
Statistics by Subject, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. NAT’L AGRIC. STAT. SERV.,
https://www.nass.usda.gov/Statistics_by_Subject/result.php?BD31E5E3-CF06-3ACC85CB-E95901EDC358 (last updated May 4, 2018) (listing the total apple crop yield for 2020
as 10.253 billion pounds); U.S.: GM Non-Browning Arctic Apple Expands into Foodservice, FRESH
FRUIT PORTAL (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.freshfruitportal.com/news/2019/08/13/u-sgm-non-browning-arctic-apple-expands-into-foodservice/ (listing the genetically modified
apple yield at an estimated eight million pounds for the 2019-2020 season).
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Developing new seed varieties is a costly venture borne by biotechnology
companies in the hopes of discovering an incredibly profitable variety.28 In 2010,
the total market value for genetically grown crops worldwide was estimated at
$14.8 billion, with one-third of the benefit, or roughly $4.93 billion, directly
benefiting the chemical and seed industry.29 Another third of the benefit is split
between farms30, of which there was an estimated 2.02 million in the United
States in 2020,31 drastically diluting the per farm benefit of genetically modified
crops.
The widespread incorporation of genetically modified seed varieties into
farming practices has paved the way for a 22 percent yield increase, despite
reducing chemical pesticide applications by 37 percent.32 One study indicated
that yield increases from growing genetically engineered crops in the European
Union could result in a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 33 million
metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalents per year, due to a reduction in the total
land needed to grow crops and the land’s ability to store carbon when not used
for agriculture.33 However, the debate over transgenic crops’ environmental
effect is incredibly polarized, with skeptics of the practice warning of potentially
damaging long-term results.34 One concern surrounding genetically modified
crops is the potential for “genetic pollution” of traits from the modified crop
into native and invasive plants, creating “super-weeds” that carry herbicideresistant traits.35 This concern is already present considering the vast number of
insect species resistant to many conventional pesticides used in tandem with
genetically modified crops.36
What Does It Take to Bring a New GM Product to Market?, GENETIC LITERACY PROJECT,
https://geneticliteracyproject.org/gmo-faq/what-does-it-take-to-bring-a-new-gm-productto-market/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2021) (listing the mean cost of developing a new seed trait and
bringing it through the regulatory process at $135 million).
29 Brad Plumer, Who Profits from GMO Technology?, VOX (July 22, 2015, 12:24 PM),
https://www.vox.com/2014/11/3/18092770/who-profits-from-gmo-technology.
30 Id.
31 Id.; Kathleen Kassel, Farming and Farm Income, ECON. RES. SERV. U.S. DEP’T AGRICULTURE,
https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/ag-and-food-statistics-charting-theessentials/farming-and-farm-income (last updated Sept. 2, 2020).
32 Wilhelm Klumper & Matin Qaim, A Meta-Analysis of the Impacts of Genetically Modified Crops,
PLOS
ONE
(Nov.
3,
2014),
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0111629#abstract0.
33 Emma Kovak et al., The Climate Benefits of Yield Increases in Genetically Engineered Crops, BIORXIV
(Feb.
10,
2021),
https://www.biorxiv.org/content/biorxiv/early/2021/02/10/2021.02.10.430488.full.pdf.
34 Amy W. Ando & Madhu Khanna, Environmental Costs and Benefits of Genetically Modified Crops:
Implications for Regulatory Strategies, 44(3) AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 435, 435–36 (2000).
35 Id. at 437-438.
36 LARRY J. GUT ET AL., Chapter 2: Managing the Community of Pests and Beneficials, in FRUIT CROP
ECOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT (2002), as reprinted in How Pesticide Resistance Develops, MICH.
STATE
UNIV.
EXTENSION,
https://www.canr.msu.edu/grapes/integrated_pest_management/how-pesticide-resistance28
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B. TRANSGENIC SEED MARKETING

1. How Seed Monopolization Affects Farmers’ Income
As mentioned previously, four companies dominate the seed industry (Bayer,
BASF, Dow-DuPont, and ChemChina).37 This combined 60 percent market
share38 has led to worries that the industry is anti-competitive, as illustrated in
Bayer’s massive selloffs before purchasing Monsanto39 and in the spin-off of
Corteva after the merging of Dow-DuPont40, all to appease antitrust regulators.
The consolidation of the seed industry is not the only monopolizing force at play.
In addition to regulators turning a blind eye to the industry’s anticompetitiveness, the federal government also grants temporary monopolies to
developers of new seed varieties to incentivize the often enormously expensive
research and development process.41 Sexually reproducing plant varieties (those
that have seeds) are not protected under traditional patent law.42 Since 1970,
however, the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) has granted patent-like
protections for up to twenty years.43 The Supreme Court has also confirmed that
the government can award utility patents for advancements in the technology of

develops (last visited Jan. 17, 2021) (“Worldwide, more than 500 species of insects, mites, and
spiders have developed some level of pesticide resistance.”).
37 Kristina Hubbard, The Sobering Details Behind the Latest Seed Monopoly Chart, CIV. EATS (Jan.
11, 2019), https://civileats.com/2019/01/11/the-sobering-details-behind-the-latest-seedmonopoly-chart/.
38 Id.
39 Dan Mangan, US Forces Germany’s Bayer to Shed $9 Billion in Ag Business in Biggest Ever AntiTrust Sell-Off, CNBC (May 30, 2018, 5:11 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/29/bayerwill-sell-basf-9-billion-in-assets-to-allow-monsanto-purchase.html (describing the required
sell-off of $9 billion of agricultural products to BASF for the Justice Department to approve
the $66 billion purchase of Monsanto).
40 Diane Bartz, Dow, DuPont Merger Wins U.S. Antitrust Approval with Conditions, REUTERS (June
15, 2017, 4:15 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-du-pont-m-a-dow/dow-dupontmerger-wins-u-s-antitrust-approval-with-conditions-idUSKBN1962SN (noting that Assistant
Attorney General Finch approved of the merger because the settlement agreed upon with the
planned split into three companies—Dow, DuPont, and Corteva—“preserve[s] rigorous
competition”).
41
See
Why
We
Patent
Seeds,
BAYER
VEGETABLES
U.S.,
https://www.vegetables.bayer.com/us/en-us/about/why-we-patent-seeds.html (last visited
Sept. 17, 2021) (stating that as a seed developer, it is essential to obtain patent protection in
order “to protect our time, ideas and investment spent to develop those products.”).
42 35 U.S.C. § 161 (granting patents for plants only to those who, among other requirements,
asexually reproduces the plant).
43 David Bennett, U.S. Seed Law History: A Primer, FARM PROGRESS, (Mar. 02, 2006),
https://www.farmprogress.com/us-seed-law-history-primer.
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living organisms such as plants.44 This protection also grants twenty years of
economic exclusivity to holders.45
In general, net farm income has continued to increase in the past few years.46
The Economic Research Service branch of the Department of Agriculture has
projected that it will reach a total of $113 billion at the end of 2021, over $15
billion more than in 2020.47 In the same period, however, national farm debt is
expected to decrease by $1.0 billion to a total of $443.9 billion.48 The estimated
average median farm income has sunk to -$1,387 for 2021, continuing the trend
of negative farm income being negative since 1996, with only one year, 2019,
breaking the trend and recording positive income values.49
A large contributor to the increase in farm debt has been the double threat
of increased agricultural input costs50 alongside the weakness in domestic
commodity markets.51 Between 1995 and 2017, the corn seed price has increased
by approximately 300 percent, with crop yield only increasing 35 percent.52 Seed
prices have increased at a disproportionate rate compared to other farm
expenses; purchasing seeds has increased from eight to almost 15 percent of a
corn farmer’s production expenses between 2000 and 2017.53
2. Single-Use Licenses in the Seed Market
Seed manufacturing giant, Monsanto (now Bayer), has gained a litigious
reputation for aggressively pursuing farmers who violated their RoundUp
Ready® cotton and soybean seeds single-use license.54 For example, in Monsanto
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 313 (1980).
How Long Does Patent, Trademark or Copyright Protection Last?, STOPFAKES.GOV,
https://www.stopfakes.gov/article?id=How-Long-Does-Patent-Trademark-or-CopyrightProtection-Last (last updated Feb. 25, 2021).
46 Highlights from the September 2021 Farm Income Forecast, SUpra note 6.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Tony Dreibus, Ag Census: Input Costs Rise, Farm Income Declines Amid Low Commodity Prices,
SUCCESSFUL FARMING (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.agriculture.com/news/business/agcensus-input-costs-rise-farm-income-declines-amid-low-commodity-prices.
51 Humeyra Pamuk, U.S. Farm Debt Soars to Levels Seen During 1980s Farm Crisis: Agriculture
Secretary, REUTERS (Feb. 27, 2019, 10:39 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-farmsperdue/u-s-farm-debt-soars-to-levels-seen-during-1980s-farm-crisis-agriculture-secretaryidUSKCN1QG24Y.
52 Seed Price Triples Over Last 20 Years, THE SCOOP: SOLUTIONS FOR THE FARMER’S ADVISOR
(July 21, 2017), https://www.thedailyscoop.com/news/seed-price-triples-over-last-20-years.
53 David Widmar, U.S. Seed Costs Drop, Remain Historically High, SUCCESSFUL FARMING (Oct.
24,
2018),
https://www.agriculture.com/news/business/us-seed-costs-drop-remainhistorically-high.
54 See generally Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (suing
McFarling for replanting patented soybeans saved from the prior year’s yield); Monsanto Co.
v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (suing Ralph for saving 904 unused bags of
modified seeds for the next growing season); Monsanto Co. v. David, 516 F.3d 1009, 1012
44
45
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Co. v. McFarling, McFarling signed a technology agreement that restricted the use
of purchased genetically modified seeds to “‘planting a commercial crop only in
a single season’” and specified that purchasers could not save the seeds for
another season’s use.55 McFarling kept the seeds and then replanted them the
next year.56 The appellate court upheld a jury verdict finding that McFarling
willingly infringed upon Monsanto’s patented technology.57 However, damages
based on the liquidated damages clause (which would have held McFarling liable
for $780,000) were invalid because the clause itself was invalid and
unenforceable.58
Biotechnology companies’ utilization of the single-use license forces farmers
to purchase expensive new seeds annually or risk legal liability.59 Farmers
switching to herbicide-tolerant genetically modified seeds see a more effective
and economical method of weed control than what prior methods could
provide.60 A 26 percent increase in farm herbicide use due to increasing weed
resistance and stagnating yields has helped offset the benefit of herbicideresistant crops.61
Single use licenses were created by software vendors in the 1980s to limit
access to easily replicated products, such as computer programs.62 Seed
companies began using the technique soon after, as seeds are another easily
replicated commodity, to preserve market and quality control over their
product.63 Such contracts usually require signing to purchase the seed and restrict
a grower from using the seeds multiple seasons.64 Manufacturers of genetically
modified seeds that use the single-use license justify the practice by pointing to
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (suing David for replanting seeds from the previous year because he did not
purchase enough modified seeds to cover his entire field and for purchased enough glyphosate
to apply to his entire field, which would kill non-modified seeds); Bowman v. Monsanto Co.,
569 U.S. 278, 278 (2013) (suing Bowman for purchasing modified soybeans meant for
consumption, planting them and taking advantage of glyphosate resistance).
55 McFarling, 302 F.3d at 1293.
56 Id.
57 McFarling., 363 F.3d at 1338.
58 Id.
59
GMOs
–
Top
Five
Concerns
for
Family
Farmers,
FARM
AID,
https://www.farmaid.org/issues/gmos/gmos-top-5-concerns-for-family-farmers/
(last
updated March 17, 2016).
60 Jerry M Green, The Benefits of Herbicide-Resistant Crops, 68(10) PEST MGMT. SCI. 1323, 1323
(May 21, 2012).
61 Elizabeth Royte, The Post-GMO Economy, MODERN FARMER (Dec. 06, 2013),
https://modernfarmer.com/2013/12/post-gmo-economy/.
62 Tim Templetion, A Brief History of Software Production and Licensing, TEMPLETON INTERACTIVE
(Nov. 08, 2013), http://www.templeton-interactive.com/blog/a-brief-history-of-softwareprotection-and-licensing/.
63
Commentary
on
Single
Use
Seed
Transactions,
SEED
INNOVATION,
https://seedinnovation.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/1491992-Single-Use-SeedAgreement-Commentary-v2-REGINA.pdf, (last visited Jan. 17, 2021).
64 Id.
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diminished efficacy of the trait in subsequent generations of the seed.65 However,
such practices have upended the traditional practice among farmers of saving
seeds from one growing season to another.66
Despite the universality of single-use licenses on genetically modified seeds,
many farmers still take the risk and attempt to save their seeds from season to
season.67 This is partly because
the funds required to purchase seed are typically needed at the
same time that farmers are likely to have a negative cash ﬂow.
And while the price of seed is a small percentage of the overall
cost of production when compared with the cost of
equipment, fuel, fertilisers, lime, herbicides and insecticides,
certiﬁed seed is consistently more expensive than farmer-saved
seed. As such, farmers who saved seed could generally reduce
principal and interest that would otherwise be paid on farm
loans.68
Seed saving is also an essential practice for many farmers culturally and is as
old as agriculture itself.69 Economically, the practice makes sense, as farmers
would save the seed from that season’s highest-yielding plants to replant the next
season to replicate that year’s economic successes.70 Some opponents of singleuse patents have compared the restriction as turning them into “virtual
sharecroppers.”71 In short, the use of single-use licenses is deeply contested and
heavily litigated in the courts.72 A primary contributor to the seed pricing issue is
Id.
La Via Campesina, Seed Laws That Criminalise Farmers: Resistance and Fightback, GRAIN (Apr.
8,
2015),
https://grain.org/article/entries/5142-seed-laws-that-criminalise-farmersresistance-and-fightback.
67 Does Monsanto Sue Farmers Who Save Patented Seeds or Mistakenly Grow GMOs?, GENETIC
LITERACY
PROJECT,
https://geneticliteracyproject.org/gmo-faq/does-monsanto-suefarmers-who-save-patented-seeds-or-mistakenly-grow-gmos/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2021)
(stating that just one company, Monsanto, “has filed 147 suits against farmers since 1997 . . .
who have knowingly violated patent rights by saving seeds”).
68 Michael Mascarenhas & Lawrence Busch, Seeds of Change: Intellectual Property Rights, Genetically
Modified Soybeans and Seed Saving in the United States, 46 SOCIOLOGIA RURALIS 122, 124 (2006)
(citation omitted).
69 Sue Senger, Save a Seed to Save Yourself: The Importance of Seed Saving in 2020, MEDIUM (Dec.
31,
2019),
https://medium.com/age-of-awareness/save-a-seed-to-save-yourself-theimportance-of-seed-saving-in-2020-e15d22127ffc.
70 Elizabeth I. Winston, A Patent Misperception, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 289, 296 (2012).
71 A Preliminary Report on Seeds & Seed Practices Across the United States, U.S. FOOD SOVEREIGNTY
ALLIANCE, http://grassrootsonline.org/sites/default/files/usfsaseedreportapril2014final.pdf
(last visited Jan. 17, 2021).
72 See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011)(holding in favor of patent
owner); Monsanto Co. v. David, 516 F.3d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2008)(holding in favor of patent
65
66
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the intellectual property protections available to manufacturers of biotech crops,
which the next sections explore in detail.
III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION FOR SEEDS
Intellectual property law is designed to protect the creations of the human
mind.73 The evolution of intellectual property law surrounding new seed varieties
is fascinating as traditional patent law does not protect seeds.74 While in the
1840s, the United States Patent and Trademark Office freely distributed highperforming seeds to farmers and afforded no ownership rights to those who
developed a new variety, statutes and other mechanisms were quickly utilized
during the Green Revolution75 to grant researchers protection over their
scientific advancements.76
Exclusivity laws were designed to adequately incentivize innovation without
over-burdening the average purchaser of such products; manufacturers of new
seed varieties have instead been accused of using them to limit competition,
which has resulted in antitrust investigations in companies like Monsanto.77 The
following sections discuss three protections commonly used with modified
seeds: (a) Plant Variety Protection Act, (b) utility patents, and (c) trade secrets.
A. PLANT VARIETY PROTECTION ACT

The Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) gives inventors up to 25 years of
exclusive control over the stable, new, uniform, and distinct varieties of tuber or
owner); Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding in favor of patent
owner); Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004)(holding in favor of patent
owner); Monsanto Co. v. Strickland, 604 F.Supp.2d 805 (D. S.C. 2009) (holding in favor of
patent owner); Monsanto Co. v. Parr, 545 F.Supp.2d 836 (N.D. Ind. 2008) (granting
permanent injunction against farmer using seeds); Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F.Supp.2d
584 (N.D. Miss. 2004)(holding in favor of patent owner); Monsanto Co. v. Swann, 308
F.Supp.2d 937 (E.D. Mo. 2003) (holding in favor of patent owner); Monsanto Co. v.
Trantham, 156 F.Supp.2d 855 (W.D. Tenn. 2001)(holding in favor of patent owner).
73 What is Intellectual Property?, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., https://www.wipo.int/aboutip/en/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2021).
74 Claire Luby et al., A Primer on Plant Breeding and Intellectual Property Rights in Organic Seed Systems,
EORGANIC, (Apr. 17, 2019), https://eorganic.org/node/27215.
75 See Raymond C. Offenheiser, The Green Revolution: Norman Borlaug and the Race to Fight Global
Hunger,
PBS,
(Apr.
3,
2020),
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/green-revolution-normanborlaug-race-to-fight-global-hunger/ (“The Green Revolution was the emergence of new
varieties of crops, specifically wheat and rice varietals, that were able to double if not triple
production of those crops in two countries.”).
76 Id.
77 Jack Kaskey & William McQuillen, Monsanto Patents May Protect Its Monopolies, THE WICHITA
EAGLE
(Aug.
08,
2014,
9:56
AM),
https://www.kansas.com/news/business/agriculture/article1027761.html.
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sexually reproducing plant varieties.78 Exclusivity runs 20 years from the
certificate’s date of issue generally, except for vines and trees, which receive
protection for 25 years.79 The PVPA grants similar protections as provided by
utility patents but differs in that the PVPA does not have strict standards of
usefulness or non-obviousness.80 Plant Variety Protections also differ from
grants under the Plant Patent Act, as PVPA does not limit protections only to
asexually reproducing plants.81
To receive the period of exclusivity, the certificate holder must prove that the
developed plant meets four requirements. The PVPA requires that the variety
be:
(1) new, in the sense that, on the date of filing of the
application for plant variety protection, propagating or
harvested material of the variety has not been sold or otherwise
disposed of to other persons. . .
(2) distinct, in the sense that the variety is clearly
distinguishable from any other variety the existence of which
is publicly known or a matter of common knowledge at the
time of the filing of the application;
(3) uniform, in the sense that any variations are
describable, predictable, and commercially acceptable; and
(4) stable, in the sense that the variety, when reproduced,
will remain unchanged with regard to the essential and
distinctive characteristics of the variety with a reasonable
degree of reliability commensurate with that of varieties of the
same category in which the same breeding method is
employed.82
The PVPA is not without criticism. One issue with the system is the
exorbitant profits that seed manufacturers can make.83 Too strong of intellectual
property rights may restrict the product unnecessarily by making it too expensive

7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2582 (2020).
Id.
80 Ashley J. (Clever) Earle, Planting Innovation: A Look into Plant Patent Protection and the Deficiencies
of the Plant Protection Act and Plant Variety Protection Act, UNIV. CIN. L. REV. (May 26, 2015),
https://uclawreview.org/2015/05/26/planting-innovation-a-look-into-plant-patentprotection-and-the-deficiencies-of-the-plant-protection-act-and-plant-variety-protectionact/.
81 Id.
82 Id. at §2402(a).
83 Kristina Hubbard, The Recent GE Supreme Court Case and Why It Matters, FARM AID (June 03,
2013),
https://www.farmaid.org/blog/the-recent-ge-supreme-court-case-and-why-itmatters/.
78
79
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for those who need it.84 On the other hand, proponents of the high margins
afforded through exclusivity argue that it allows manufacturers to devote more
significant capital to the next research product.85
B. UTILITY PATENTS

Another form of intellectual property protection available to seed
manufacturers is utility patents, which can protect all the research and
development pipeline steps from the techniques to create the plants to the
physical plant itself.86 There are two requirements for a seed to qualify for
protection under the utility patent framework:
[A] plant breeder must show that the plant he has developed is
new, useful, and nonobvious . . . In addition, the plant must
meet the specifications of § 112, which require a written
description of the plant and a deposit of seed that is publicly
accessible.87
The ability for a new plant variety to receive intellectual property protections
under the Plant Protection Act (PPA) or the PVPA does not foreclose a
manufacturer from receiving protections under the utility patent regime.88 This
is because utility patents grant greater protections than either the PVPA or
PPA.89 Utility patent protection begins on the date that the patent is issued and
extends for twenty years.90

GianCarlo Moschini & Oleg Yerokhin, The Economic Incentive to Innovate in Plants: Patents and
Plant Breeders’ Rights, in AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
SEEDS
OF
CHANGE
2
(2007),
https://www.card.iastate.edu/faculty/profiles/giancarlo_moschini/Moschini-YerokhinKesan-book-preprint.pdf.
85 Id.
86 Marriam Lin, Growth Through Intellectual Property - Plant Protection through Utility Patents,
Certificates,
and
Plant
Patents,
JD
SUPRA
(Oct.
12,
2018),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/growth-through-intellectual-property-14166/.
87 JEM Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 131 (2001) (citation
omitted).
88 Id. at 132.
89 Earle, supra note 80 (“While the PPA and PVPA require less disclosure, they also offer less
protection in return. A plant utility patent covers the plant, the methods of making or using
the plant, and methods of breeding the plant, the PPA and PVPA only cover the exact plant
and its clones, or in the case of PVPA’s, the plant and its clones or the plant and its
homozygous seed.”).
90
Gene Quinn, What is a Utility Patent?, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 22, 2017),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/04/22/utility-patent/id=82498/.
84
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C. TRADE SECRET

A trade secret is information that: (1) has an economic value from being
unknown, (2) has value to those who cannot access it, and (3) takes reasonable
efforts to maintain secrecy.91 In general, trade secret law acts in complement to
patent law.92 There is a wide variety of information protected under trade secret
law and applies to a broader range of information than patent law.93
While patent law is designed to protect inventors and encourage innovation,
trade secrets are exclusively designed to protect existing information and are not
designed to inspire new technological developments.94 Strong trade secrecy
protections have been criticized for hurting long-term innovation and limiting
the productivity of contemporary inventors.95 Additionally, because trade secret
protections have no expiration date, there will be no eventual public benefit from
information sharing.96
Protecting trade secrets is incredibly important to the agricultural industry.
For example, in 2019, a former agricultural engineer for Monsanto was indicted
for attempting to distribute protected predictive algorithms to a Chinese
government-sponsored research institute.97 The value of trade secret protection
is exceptionally high in crops that rely on two secret inbred parent lines to create
the hybrid seed, such as corn.98 This protection, however, does little for
manufacturers of self or open-pollinated crops such as soybeans.99
In the following sections, this Note explores how agricultural subsidies are
distributed and how increasing federal agricultural research spending would be a
more effective solution to high seed costs than altering the current intellectual
property framework.
IV. AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES
As discussed previously, the production of new seed varieties using an
intentional selection of desirable traits (either through cross-breeding or

Trade Secret Policy, U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/ip-policy/trade-secretpolicy (last visited Jan. 17, 2021).
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Andrea Contigiani & David H. Hsu, How Trade Secrets Hurt Innovation, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan.
29, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/01/how-trade-secrets-hurt-innovation.
95 Id.
96 Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 11 (2007).
97 Marc S. Reisch, Ex-Monsanto Scientist Indicted for Trade Secret Theft, C&EN (Nov. 27, 2019),
https://cen.acs.org/food/agriculture/Ex-Monsanto-scientist-indicted-trade-secrettheft/97/web/2019/11.
98 Debra L. Blair, Intellectual Property Protection and Its Impact on the U.S. Seed Industry, 4 DRAKE J.
AGRIC. L. 297, 307 (1999).
99 Id.
91
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biotechnology) has existed almost as long as agriculture.100 While seed
manufacturers have become increasingly wealthy from incorporating
biotechnology into the seed manufacturing process, American farmers do not
match profit increases. They are instead facing four percent higher poverty rates
than non-rural areas.101 The following sections discuss how agricultural subsidies
are distributed pre-market to seed developers and post-market to farmers.
A. POST-MARKET SUBSIDIES TO FARMERS

In 2019, farmers received over $22 billion in agricultural subsidies to
supplement farm income and influence commodity supplies.102 This section
provides an overview of how and why agricultural subsidies are distributed and
how seed manufacturers impact their needs.
Agricultural subsidies are appropriated every five years through a
comprehensive omnibus bill called the Farm Bill.103 Subsidies to farmers have
been an integral part of all farm bills and even prompted its inception to
encourage conservation and raise farm incomes during the Great Depression.104
However, since the 1980s, the proportion of crops covered by agricultural
subsidies has dropped significantly.105 The oldest form of crop subsidy takes the
form of direct to farmer commodity program payments, which “are triggered
when the annual market price for an eligible crop drops below a statutory
minimum or when revenue is below a guaranteed level.”106 Introduced in 2000,
the other most common form of subsidy is the Crop Insurance Program, which
is a federally subsidized program that indemnifies policy holders against below-

Ania & Mark, supra note 19.
Rural Poverty and Well-Being, supra note 8.
102 Dan Charles, Farmers Got Billions From Taxpayers in 2019, and Hardly Anyone Objected, NPR
(Dec.
31,
2019,
4:13
PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2019/12/31/790261705/farmers-got-billions-fromtaxpayers-in-2019-and-hardly-anyone-objected.
103
What
is
the
Farm
Bill?,
NAT’L
SUSTAINABLE
AGRIC.
COAL.,
https://sustainableagriculture.net/our-work/campaigns/fbcampaign/what-is-the-farm-bill/
(last visited Jan. 17, 2021).
104
What is the Farm Bill?, CONG. RES. SERV. (Sept. 26, 2020),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22131.pdf.
105 Daniel Griswold, Should the United States Cut Its Farm Subsidies?, CATO INST. (Apr. 27, 2007),
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/should-united-states-cut-its-farmsubsidies.
106 Sahar Angadjivand, U.S. Farm Commodity Support: An Overview of Selected Programs, CONG. RES.
SERV. (Apr. 17, 2018), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R45165.pdf.
100
101
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average yields or revenue.107 Farm payments as a percent of net farm income
have increased significantly, growing from 25% in 2010 to 56% in 2019.108
Farm subsidies are also paid out through the Commodity Credit Corporation
(CCC).109 The CCC “is a wholly-owned Government corporation created in 1933
under a Delaware charter and reincorporated June 30, 1948, as a Federal
corporation within the Department of Agriculture by the Commodity Credit
Corporation Charter Act.”110 In 2019, $14.34 billion were distributed through
the CCC to compensate farmers for losses due to the ongoing trade war with
China.111 However, unlike subsidies through the Farm Bill, these funds were not
allocated explicitly by Congress.112
Crops that are eligible for direct payments are traditional commodity crops
such as corn, seed cotton, and soybeans.113 While majorly tailored to these
traditional field crops, federal crop insurance programs have begun slowly
expanding insurance to some 300 specialty crops.114 Because farm subsidies are
only limited to these commodity crops, the number of farmers growing these
crops has surged.115 Because many of these crops are also large-profit drivers for
genetically modified seed sellers, manufacturers have profited handsomely from
the agricultural subsidy systems.116 The next section will focus on government
subsidies allocated to the development of new seed varieties.

Crop Insurance Program Provisions – Title XI, ECON. RES. SERV. U.S. DEP’T AGRICULTURE,
https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/farm-commodity-policy/crop-insuranceprogram-provisions-title-xi/ (last updated Sept. 27, 2021).
108 Jerry Pierce, Government Payments 2010-2019, U. KY. COLLEGE AGRIC., FOOD AND ENV’T,
(Aug. 25, 2020), https://agecon.ca.uky.edu/government-payments-2010-2019.
109 Commodity Credit Corporation, U.S. DEP’T AGRICULTURE, https://www.usda.gov/ccc (last
visited Jan. 17, 2021).
110 Id.
111 Charles, supra note 102.
112 Id.
113
Crop Commodity Programs, ECON. RES. SERV. U.S. DEPT AGRICULTURE,
https://www.ers.usda.gov/agriculture-improvement-act-of-2018-highlights-andimplications/crop-commodity-programs/ (last updated Aug. 20, 2019).
114 Isabel Rosa & Renée Johnson, Federal Crop Insurance: Specialty Crops, CONG. RES. SERV.,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R45459.pdf (last updated Jan. 14, 2019).
115 Brian Barth, Congress Finally Passed a New Farm Bill and It Continues to Pay Homage to the Cult of
Corn
and
Soy,
MODERN
FARMER
(Jan.
07,
2019),
https://modernfarmer.com/2019/01/congress-finally-passed-a-new-farm-bill-and-itcontinues-to-pay-homage-to-the-cult-of-corn-and-soy/.
116 Daniel Imhoff, Overhauling the Farm Bill: The Real Beneficiaries of Subsidies, THE ATLANTIC (Mar.
21, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/03/overhauling-the-farm-billthe-real-beneficiaries-of-subsidies/254422/.
107
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B. THE BLURRING OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESEARCH INITIATIVES

In 2015, $4.523 billion of public money was spent on agricultural research
and development.117 This is compared to the $12.263 billion spent in 2014 on
agricultural research and development in the private sector.118 For comparison,
only €10 billion in the European Union was allocated for agricultural research
between 2021 and 2027, coming out to around €1.4 billion per year.119 Subsidies
aimed at incentivizing research are often praised for being effective policies that
benefit the welfare of everyone;120 however, when corporations can take
advantage of public resources to benefit their market dominance, the close
public-private research relationship begins to seem more predatory.121
The blurred lines between public and private money with regards to
agricultural research are perpetrated in two ways. First, for-profit entities
routinely receive research funding through the United States Department of
Agriculture.122 Second, private corporations fund research at public universities,
leading to questionable results and research that does not benefit the public.123
Through sub-agencies such as the Small Business Innovation Research
Program, the UDSA makes millions of dollars of grant money available to
support agricultural research initiatives.124 For instance, the Specialty Crop
Research Initiative estimates that it will grant up to $80 million for projects that

Agricultural Research Funding in the Public and Private Sectors, ECON. RES. SERV. U.S. DEP’T
AGRICULTURE (Feb. 2019), https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/agricultural-researchfunding-in-the-public-and-private-sectors/.
118 Id.
119 James McEldowney, EU Agricultural Research and Innovation, MEMBERS’ RES. SERV. (Jan.
2019),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/630358/EPRS_BRI(2019)6
30358_EN.pdf.
120 Harry de Gorter et al., Productive and Predatory Public Policies: Research Expenditures and Producer
Subsidies in Agriculture, 74(1) AM. J. OF AGRIC. ECON. 27, 27 (1992).
121 Public Research, Private Gain Corporate Research Over University Agricultural Research, FOOD &
WATER
WATCH
(Apr.
2012),
https://foodandwaterwatch.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/03/Public-Research-Private-Gain-Report-April-2012.pdf.
122 See, e.g., USDA Awards $8.3 Million in Small Business Research Grants to Support Agricultural
Research and Development, NAT’L INST. OF FOOD AND AGRIC., https://nifa.usda.gov/pressrelease/usda-awards-83-million-small-business-research-grants-support-agricultural-research
(last visited Oct. 12, 2021) (providing examples of private research projects that receive
funding through the National Institute of Food and Agriculture).
123 Molly McCluskey, Public Universities Get an Education in Private Industry, THE ATLANTIC, (Apr.
3, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/04/public-universities-getan-education-in-private-industry/521379/.
124 NIFA Awards Over $16M for Small Business Innovation Research Program Phase II, NAT’L INST.
FOOD AND AGRIC., (NOV. 19, 2020), https://nifa.usda.gov/press-release/sbir-ii.
117
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improve crop characteristics or address pest threats.125 Despite having sales of
€43.5 billion in 2019,126 Bayer and other large agricultural manufacturers qualify
for these grants as they are open to for-profit organizations that are not small
businesses.127
Private corporations fund most of the research in the United States.128 In
research conducted by public universities, the fear is that corporate funding leads
to published data biased towards the sponsor and is not truly neutral.129 This fear
has become a reality, as research consulting agreements, a type of non-disclosure
agreement, limit researchers’ ability to publish data that is not favorable to the
industry.130 Industry sponsors have been shown to influence studies’ design, so
the results are favorable to their products.131 The following section describes the
issue with the blurred public and private agricultural research spending in the
context of intellectual property rights.
C. THE PROBLEM WITH PUBLIC-PRIVATE RESEARCH MERGING AND THE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME

Public agricultural funding has been highly successful in reducing the effects
of various disruptions on the agricultural market.132 Despite the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) spending $24.5 billion on farm support
programs,133 the median farm income is only $296.134 The medium income is so
low despite the farm support programs because farming commodity crops are

Specialty Crop Research Initiative, NAT’L INST. FOOD AND AGRIC.,
https://nifa.usda.gov/funding-opportunity/specialty-crop-research-initiative-scri,
(last
visited Jan. 17, 2021).
126 Matej Mikulic, Bayer Group’s Total Sales from 1995-2020, STATISTA (Mar. 10, 2020),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/263778/revenue-of-bayer-ag-since-1995/.
127 U.S. DEP’T AGRICULTURE, supra note 113.
128 Beethika Khan et al., The State of U.S. Science and Engineering 2020, NATL. CTR. FOR SCI.
& ENG’G STAT., (Jan. 2020), https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsb20201/u-s-r-d-performanceand-funding.
129 Alice Fabbri et al., The Influence of Industry Sponsorship on the Research Agenda: A Scoping Review,
108(11) AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH e9, e9 (Nov. 2018).
130 McCluskey, supra note 123.
131 Lisa Bero, When Big Companies Fund Academic Research, the Truth Often Comes Last, THE
CONVERSATION (Oct. 02, 2019, 4:04 PM), https://theconversation.com/when-bigcompanies-fund-academic-research-the-truth-often-comes-last-119164.
132 Kimberly Amadeo, Farm Subsidies with Pros, Cons, and Impact, THE BALANCE (Nov. 9, 2020),
https://www.thebalance.com/farm-subsidies-4173885.
133
Farm
Programs,
U.S.
GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF.,
https://www.gao.gov/key_issues/farm_programs/issue_summary, (last visited Jan. 17,
2021).
134 U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV., supra note 6.
125
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increasingly costly.135 Farming inputs, such as seeds, have increased dramatically
in price because of the intellectual property protections that manufacturers can
take advantage of.136 Industry supporters state that the increased cost of seed is
mitigated by a more profitable harvest137; however, when the market price is
artificially sustained through crop subsidies, farmers benefit little from increased
yields.138
As previously mentioned, the lines between public and private in the
agricultural world are further blurred by private funding of public research.139 In
fact, as federal funding of public land grant universities has dried up, these
universities have turned to private entities to receive up to a quarter of
agricultural research funds.140 Many of these funds go towards research to
develop new seed varieties patented and profited by the sponsoring
corporation.141 Therefore, public resources are being used to bring benefit only
to private industry. Industry research also limits the quality and transparency of
public research. Having a majority of research be privately funded keeps research
from going in the most needed, as corporate desires constrain it.142 Additionally,
nondisclosure agreements between researchers and industry funders are
becoming increasingly common, where harmful data, or any data at all, about a
corporate product, is blocked from being published.143 Since universities require
publishable research for graduate students and professors, these industry-forced
vows of silence are especially disconcerting.144
Public research and funding subsidies are designed to increase food security
sustainably and stabilize market price and availability.145 The mechanisms
funding these ventures were created before seeds were extended patent rights.146
Tony Dreibus, Ag Census: Input Costs Rise, Farm Income Declines Amid Low Commodity Prices,
SUCCESSFUL FARMING (Apr. 18, 2019) https://www.agriculture.com/news/business/agcensus-input-costs-rise-farm-income-declines-amid-low-commodity-prices.
136 Haley Stein, Note, Intellectual Property and Genetically Modified Seeds: The United States, Trade, and
the Developing World, 3 NW. J. TECH & INTELL. PROP. 151, 168-169 (2005).
137 Royte, supra note 61.
138 Chuck Abbott, As Crop Prices Sink, Farm Subsidies Soar, SUCCESSFUL FARMING (Jan. 28,
2016),
https://www.agriculture.com/news/policy/as-crop-prices-sink-farm-subsidiessoar_4-ar52084.
139 FOOD & WATER WATCH, supra note 121.
140 Id.
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142 McCluskey, supra note 123.
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144 Id.
145 History of Agricultural Subsidies in the US and EU, COMP. FOOD POL., https://foodstudies.net/foodpolitics/agricultural-subsidies/jades-sample-page/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2021).
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https://news.uga.edu/birthplace-public-higher-education-america/ (stating that the first
public university was chartered in 1785); Daniel A. Sumner, Agricultural Subsidy Programs, LIBR.
ECON.
AND
LIBERTY,
https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/AgriculturalSubsidyPrograms.html (last visited Jan.
135

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol29/iss1/7

20

Slater: Poverty via Monopolization

2021]

POVERTY VIA MONOPOLIZATION

229

Given the difficulties in merging public assistance funding with corporate
intellectual property rights, it seems likely that farmers will continue to suffer at
the junction of these incompatible systems. The final part of this Note argues
that pre-market research funding and post-market agricultural subsidies need to
be altered to better respond to a world with patentable seeds.
V. FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE SEED PRICING PROBLEMS
The discussion above paints a grim picture. The current intellectual property
framework has not achieved its goal of balancing innovation and public
knowledge. Additionally, federal funding of agricultural programs has not
successfully raised crop prices nor disseminated widespread public research.
It should be noted that both corporations and governments have taken some
steps to solve these issues. For example, agricultural product giant Bayer has a
sustainability target to support 100 million smallholder farms by 2030.147
Furthermore, many large production agriculture leaders pride themselves on
developing technologies that contribute to the fight against hunger and
poverty.148 Colorado passed legislation in 2017 that reimburses farmers 50% of
the costs associated with hiring an apprentice, reducing agricultural production’s
input costs.149
These efforts have one thing in common: they illustrate that attention is being
drawn to farm poverty. Unfortunately, this attention increase has not
corresponded with the alleviation of the problem, and all the initiatives above do
not serve as a complete solution. Corporate efforts are primarily aimed at
reducing farm poverty in developing countries, but little is done to reduce the
impact of strict intellectual property protections on farm income in the United
States. The Colorado statute is a good start, but it only addresses a partial
contributor to the larger issue. Therefore, the federal government should step in
to correct this issue.
As discussed earlier, farm income is negatively impacted by high seed prices.
Temporary monopolies given to seed manufacturers limit competition necessary

17, 2021) (stating that current agricultural subsidies started in 1933 with the Agricultural
Adjustment Act); Variety Protection Regulations, UNIV. MINN. EXTENSION,
https://extension.umn.edu/small-grains-crop-and-variety-selection/variety-protectionregulations (last visited Jan. 17, 2021) (stating that the PVPA extended patent rights to seeds
in 1970).
147 Our Targets to Be Met by 2030, BAYER, https://www.bayer.com/en/sustainability/targets
(last visited Sept. 12, 2021).
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2019), https://talkpoverty.org/2019/02/08/farming-generation-nowhere-grow/.
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to drive down prices. Single-use licenses force farmers to purchase new seed
every season instead of participating in traditional seed-saving programs.150
Seed developers aggressively enforce their intellectual property protections,
even in situations where the breaching party did so unintentionally. For instance,
Monsanto had sued 56 small businesses and 410 farmers for patent infringement
as of 2013, only winning, on average, $49,356 per suit.151 Efforts to raise farmer
income through farm subsidies have been hindered on both sides of harvest.
Rising input costs from increased seed and equipment prices have been
exacerbated by lowered crop prices caused by market consolidation.152 The
funding difficulty is despite a large amount of public money and resources
directed towards research that helps agricultural manufacturers develop new
technologies protected through the intellectual property system.
While the introduction of intellectual property protection into the seed
market has produced the problems discussed above, the solution is not
dismantling protections. Before the PVPA was passed, the seed market was one
of the last remaining markets that did not have patent protection, as utility,
design, and plant patents covered almost everything else.153 Patent protection for
new seed varieties is essential because of the cost and time requirements of
developing new seeds.154 On average, it takes eight years and $135 million to
bring a new genetically modified seed variety to market.155
Since developing new seed varieties is incredibly expensive, companies could
not justify developing new varieties without a promised exclusivity period.156
New seed development and patent protections are necessary if we continue to
address food insecurity issues.157 Therefore, the solution to the adverse effects
of intellectual property protection must not outweigh its benefits. Federal
funding should ultimately be redirected from farm subsidies to public agricultural
See supra Part II(b)(2) (explaining how single use licenses function in the seed market).
Paul Harris, Monsanto Sued Small Farmers to Protect Seed Patents, Report Says, GUARDIAN (Feb.
12, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/feb/12/monsanto-suesfarmers-seed-patents.
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153
See Types of Patents, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Mar. 31, 2016),
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/data/patdesc.htm (describing the six
types of patents that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office issues).
154 BAYER VEGETABLES U.S., supra note 41.
155 GENETIC LITERACY PROJECT, supra note 28.
156 BAYER VEGETABLES U.S., supra note 41.
157 See Abubakar Ibrahim, Improved Seeds Key to Sustainable Food Security, African Plant Breeders Say,
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(Jan.
14,
2020),
https://allianceforscience.cornell.edu/blog/2020/01/improved-seeds-key-to-sustainablefood-security-african-plant-breeders-say/ (describing how the African Plant Breeders
Association believes that improved seeds and plant breeding techniques are a better way to
address food insecurity than current methods).
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research. This shift would ensure that research is centered on what is in the public
interest, instead of at the corporate interest, and would reduce the unintentional
encouragement to grow high-input-cost genetically modified commodity crops.
Ultimately, seeds developed through public funding will cost less for farmers
because of the lack of profit incentive, reducing the reliance on agricultural
subsidies. Additionally, the industry would have low-cost seed varieties to
compete against, which would result in lower seed costs across the board.
Creating a publicly funded competitor to a tiny field of large agricultural research
corporations would increase competition and price reduction without
discouraging seed manufacturers from developing new varieties by reducing
intellectual property protections. At-risk, however, is reducing farm subsidies
before the effects of publicly funded agricultural research hit the market.
Therefore, until the increased publicly funded agricultural research results in
lower-cost marketable products, farm subsidies must stay at the same high
current rate. The solution to the battle against farm poverty is complicated and
requires balancing many interests ranging from developers’ intellectual property
rights to the public’s interest in an efficient and fair food production system.
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